Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 172 (1):177 - 191 (2010)
|Abstract||Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation|
|Keywords||Signaling Evolution Dynamics Replicator Replicator-mutator Moran|
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