Evolutionary explanations of indicatives and imperatives

Erkenntnis 66 (3):409 - 436 (2007)
Abstract
Recently there has been some interest in studying the explanation of meaning by using signaling games. I shall argue that the meaning of signals in signaling games remains sufficiently unclear to motivate further investigation. In particular, the possibility of distinguishing imperatives and indicatives at a fundamental level will be explored. Thereby I am trying to preserve the generality of the signaling games framework while bringing it closer to human languages. A number of convergence results for the evolutionary dynamics of our models will be proved.
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William F. Harms (2000). Adaptation and Moral Realism. Biology and Philosophy 15 (5):699-712.

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