David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In A. Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience. MIT Press (2011)
The core claim of this paper is that mind minding of the sort required for the simplest and most pervasive forms of joint attentional activity is best understood and explained in non-representational, enactivist terms. In what follows I will attempt to convince the reader of its truth in three steps. The first step, section two, clarifies the target explanandum. The second step, section three, is wholly descriptive. It highlights the core features of a Radically Enactivist proposal about elementary mind minding, revealing it to be at least a possible explanans. The final step is to consider the comparative virtues of the contending proposals; section four. The exercise is to decide which of the possible explanations is best. Various evidential appeals and theoretical considerations that might aid us in this choice are reviewed. The conclusion is that the scales would be tipped in favour of the Radical Enactivist option, decisively, if it should turn out that there is (1) no reason to believe that basic forms of mentality are representational (in a semantically contentful way) and (2) if no good theory is likely to explain how they could be so. It is concluded that all that we need for understanding basic forms of intentional (with a ‘t’) mentality and what it takes to attend to basic cases of mind minding.
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Citations of this work BETA
Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner (2012). Dynamic Embodied Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
Marco Caracciolo (2012). Narrative, Meaning, Interpretation: An Enactivist Approach. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):367-384.
Jane Suilin Lavelle (2012). Two Challenges to Hutto's Enactive Account of Pre-Linguistic Social Cognition. Philosophia 40 (3):459-472.
Michael Wilby (2012). Embodying the False-Belief Tasks. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.
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