Turning Hard Problems on their Heads

Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. I attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely first-personally or third-personally nor, concomitantly, can we start such investigations using either first-personal or third-personal methods
Keywords Consciousness  Experience  Intersubjectivity  Metaphysics  Phenomenology
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-005-9013-8
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Dan Zahavi (2005). Intentionality and Experience. Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):299-318.
E. J. Lowe (1995). There Are No Easy Problems of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):266-71.

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