David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88 (2006)
Much of the difficulty in assessing theories of consciousness stems from their advocates not supplying adequate or convincing characterisations of the phenomenon they hope to explain. Yet, to make any reasonable assessment this is precisely what is required, for it is not as if our ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions are philosophically innocent. I attempt to reveal, using a recent debate between Chalmers and Dennett as a foil, why, in approaching this topic, we cannot characterise the data purely first-personally or third-personally nor, concomitantly, can we start such investigations using either first-personal or third-personal methods
|Keywords||Consciousness Experience Intersubjectivity Metaphysics Phenomenology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Daniel D. Hutto (1998). An Ideal Solution to the Problems of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (3):328-43.
Dan Zahavi (2001). Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):151-167.
David Woodruff Smith (2000). Ontological Phenomenology. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr 243-251.
Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (2007). Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology. In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press 67--87.
Jonathan Shear (1996). The Hard Problem: Closing the Empirical Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):54-68.
Barry F. Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
Anderson Weekes (2010). Consciousness and Causation in Whitehead's Phenomenology of Becoming. In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. State University of New York Press
Richard D. Winfield (2006). Self-Consciousness and Intersubjectivity. Review of Metaphysics 59 (4):757-779.
Piet Hut & Roger N. Shepard (1996). Turning the "Hard Problem" Upside-Down and Sideways. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):313-29.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads546 ( #548 of 1,707,766 )
Recent downloads (6 months)444 ( #59 of 1,707,766 )
How can I increase my downloads?