Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73 (2004)
|Abstract||It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of 'embodied practice', I defend a secondpersonal approach in this paper|
|Keywords||Explanation Folk Psychology Metaphysics Prediction Second Person|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jonathan Knowles (2002). Is Folk Psychology Different? Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.
Joshua Knobe (2006). The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):203-231.
Karsten R. Stueber (2009). The Ethical Dimension of Folk Psychology? Inquiry 52 (5):532-547.
Ian Ravenscroft, Folk Psychology as a Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Two Contrasts: Folk Craft Vs Folk Science and Belief Vs Opinion. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2006). "Folk Psychology" is Not Folk Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
Martin Davies & Tony Stone (1998). Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
John D. Greenwood (1992). Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #31,657 of 722,753 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,437 of 722,753 )
How can I increase my downloads?