David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181 (2012)
Predicates of taste, such as?fun? and?tasty?, have received considerable attention in recent debates between contextualists and relativists, with considerations involving disagreement playing a central role. Considerations involving disagreement have been taken to present a problem for contextualist treatments of predicates of taste. My goal is to argue that considerations involving disagreement do not undermine contextualism. To the extent that relativism was supposed to be motivated by contextualists being unable to deal with disagreement, this motivation is lacking. The argument against contextualism rests on a too simple and narrow conception of disagreement that turns out to be problematic once we consider a wider range of cases. If we reject the assumptions about disagreement that the argument rests on, it no longer poses a threat to contextualism.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, Usa.
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Simon Blackburn (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford University Press.
Allan Gibbard (2003). Thinking How to Live. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Michele Palmira (2015). The Semantic Significance of Faultless Disagreement. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):349-371.
Teresa Marques (2015). Retractions. Synthese:1-25.
Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero (2014). Disagreement About Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):701-723.
John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo (2016). Matters of Ambiguity: Faultless Disagreement, Relativism and Realism. Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1517-1536.
Carl Baker (2013). The Role of Disagreement in Semantic Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-18.
Similar books and articles
Robin McKenna (2012). Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Writings.
Isidora Stojanovic (2007). Talking About Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):691-706.
Carl Baker (2012). Indexical Contextualism and the Challenges From Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):107-123.
Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes (2014). Disagreement Without Error. Erkenntnis 79 (1):143-154.
Ragnar Francén (2010). No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists. Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37.
John MacFarlane (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder (2013). Reversibility or Disagreement. Mind 122 (485):43-84.
Karl Schafer (2011). Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):265-286.
John K. Davis (2010). An Alternative to Relativism. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
Tamina Stephenson (2007). Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predicates of Personal Taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (4):487--525.
Peter Lasersohn (2005). Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
Teresa Marques (2014). Doxastic Disagreement. Erkenntnis 79 (1):121-142.
James Dreier (2009). Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-110.
Stojanovic (2011). When (True) Disagreement Gives Out. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (32):183-195.
Added to index2011-03-18
Total downloads157 ( #26,260 of 1,941,073 )
Recent downloads (6 months)23 ( #24,032 of 1,941,073 )
How can I increase my downloads?