Mind and World
Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181 (1997)
| Abstract | How do rational minds make contact with the world? The empiricist tradition sees a gap between mind and world, and takes sensory experience, fallible as it is, to provide our only bridge across that gap. In its crudest form, for example, the traditional idea is that our minds consult an inner realm of sensory experience, which provides us with evidence about the nature of external reality. Notoriously, however, it turns out to be far from clear that there is any viable conception of experience which allows it to do the job. The original problem is to show that thought is rationally constrained by external reality. If sensory experience is to provide the solution--in particular, if it is to provide the answer to sceptical challenges--it must therefore meet two criteria. First, it must itself be `receptive'--i.e., appropriately constrained by external reality. Second, it must be the kind of thing that can enter into a logical or rational relationship with belief--it must already be `conceptual,' in other words. In arguing against the idea that anything could serve both roles, Wilfred Sellars termed this conception of experience "the Myth of the Given." | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesMichael G. F. Martin (2006). On Being Alienated. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Steven Lehar (2003). The World in Your Head: A Gestalt View of the Mechanism of Conscious Experience. Lawrence Erlbaum.
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Experiencing the Facts: Critical Notice of Mind and World, by John McDowell. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:613-36.
Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Experiencing the Facts (Critical Notice of Mcdowell). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:613-36.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-08-10Total downloads68 ( #13,275 of 556,837 )Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #13,107 of 556,837 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
