David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialogue 41 (01):3-26 (2002)
It is sometimes objected that anti-individualism, because of its assumption of the constitutive role of natural and social environments in the individuation of intentional attitudes, raises sceptical worries about first-person authority--that peculiar privilege each of us is thought to enjoy with respect to non-Socratic self-knowledge. Gary Ebbs believes that this sort of objection can be circumvented, if we give up metaphysical realism and scientific naturalism and adopt what he calls a “participant perspective” on our linguistic practices. Drawing on broadly Wittgensteinian considerations, I argue that Ebbs is right about this, and I show how two likely objections to his view can be circumvented. I also argue that mere adoption of the participant perspective does not serve to refute external-world sceptic.
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Thomas Nagel (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1982). Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969). On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright). Harper Torchbooks.
Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer L. Woodrow (2010). Are There Real Rules for Adding? Dialogue 49 (3):455-477.
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