Internal Relations and Analyticity: Wittgenstein and Quine

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):591 - 612 (1996)
L'A. défend la thèse selon laquelle Wittgenstein développe une conception pragmatique et linguistique des relations internes qui définissent les vérités nécessaires: 1) qui n'implique pas l'analyticité de toutes les propositions exprimant des relations internes, 2) qui établit une distinction entre l'analytique et le synthétique, 3) qui s'avère compatible avec la critique de l'analyticité entreprise par Quine.
Keywords internal relations  analytic-synthetic distinction  Wittgenstein  Quine
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1996.10717469
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