The Dignity of a Rule: Wittgenstein, Mathematical Norms, and Truth

Dialogue 42 (03):419-446 (2003)
Abstract
Paul Boghossian (1996; 1998)argues that Wittgenstein suffered from a "confusion" (1996, 377) if he thought that he could treat propositions of logic and mathematics both as rules and as being true as a matter of convention. He also suggests that such "rule-prescriptivism" (377) about math and logic leads to a vicious regress (1998). Focusing on Wittgenstein's normativism about mathematics, I argue that neither of these claims is true.
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Boghossian (2000). Knowledge of Logic. In Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori.
Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Review: Sense, Reference and Rule-Following. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1):139 - 144.

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Cesare Cozzo (2004). Rule-Following and the Objectivity of Proof. In Annalisa Coliva & Eva Picardi (eds.), Wittgenstein Today. Il poligrafo. 185--200.
Sílvio Pinto (1998). Wittgenstein's Anti-Platonism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 56:109-132.
Mark McCullagh (2002). Wittgenstein on Rules and Practices. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:83-100.
Hilary Putnam (1996). On Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70 (70):243-264.
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