The most general factive stative attitude

Analysis 74 (4):561-565 (2014)
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Abstract

I discuss Timothy Willliamson’s conjecture that ‘knowing is the most general factive stative attitude, that which one has to a proposition if one has any factive stative attitude to it at all’

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10.1093/analys/anu083

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John Hyman
University College London

Citations of this work

Facts, Factives, and Contrafactives.Richard Holton - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):245-266.
Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.
The unity of knowledge.John Hyman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Non-Accidentally Factive Mental States.Mahdi Ranaee - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (3):493-510.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

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