What, if anything, are colours relative to?
Philosophy 80 (4):475-494 (2005)
| Abstract | The questions considered are whether colours are relative to systems of colour concepts, to the conditions in which they are observed, or to observers or communities of observers; and whether the relativity of colours, such as it is, implies that they are less real than shapes or intervals in time. The argument is based on the thought that Special Relativity provides the best available intellectual framework for thinking about the supposed relativity of qualities of physical things. | |||||||||
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Fiona Macpherson (2003). Novel Colours and the Content of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.
Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (forthcoming). Philosophical Issues About Colour Vision. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
John Campbell (1993). A Simple View of Colour. In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection. Oup.
Ralph Schumacher (2007). Guest Editor's Introduction. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2).
John Campbell (1997). The Simple View of Colour. In Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color. Mit Press.
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