In defence of “hard” offers: A reply to J.p. Day

Philosophia 20 (3):325-327 (1990)
In commenting on our earlier article in IPhilosophiaD, J P Day raises four issues: those concerning (1) the correct interpretation of the concept of "conditional offers," (2) the relationship of hard conditional offers to liberty, (3) the role of preferences in distinguishing offers from threats, and (4) the moral wrongness of some forms of offering. Two of these points, the second and the third, give rise to some further argument
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DOI 10.1007/BF02382100
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