Warranted assertability maneuvers and the rules of assertion

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469 (2008)
Abstract: In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes use a warranted assertability maneuver (WAM), according to which we mistakenly judge an assertion to be true because we confuse conversational propriety with truth. I argue that no invariantist WAM against Stewart Cohen's Airport Case can succeed. The problem is that such a WAM is inconsistent with the known ways of accounting for the evidence that motivates the knowledge account of assertion.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2008.00330.x
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.

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Citations of this work BETA
Mikkel Gerken (2015). How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.

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