David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Economics and Philosophy 11 (1):1 (1995)
This paper is about the relevance, to the definition of freedom, of values or goods other than freedom. In this respect,its subject matter is not at all new. However, I do believe that new light can be thrown on the nature of this relationship by paying more attention to another relationship – one which exists within the concept of freedom itself. There are two senses in which we can be said to possess freedom. Firstly, there is the sense in which we can be said to be free to do a certain particular thing. Secondly,there is the sense in which we can be said to possess a certain ‘amount’,‘degree’ or ‘quantity’ of freedom, in some overall sense. 1 I believe that most recent accounts of the relationship between freedom and other goods are inconsistent, because they see those other goods as affecting the truth value of claims about freedom in the second sense, but not in the first
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Joseph Raz (1986). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford University Press.
Robert Nozick (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books.
John Rawls (1971). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
John Rawls (2009). A Theory of Justice. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Philosophy and Rhetoric. Oxford University Press 133-135.
Norman Daniels (1979). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. Journal of Philosophy 76 (5):256-282.
Citations of this work BETA
Brian Barry (1996). Real Freedom and Basic Income. Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (3):242–276.
Robert Sudgen (1998). The Metric of Opportunity. Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):307.
Similar books and articles
Alfred F. MacKay (1986). Extended Sympathy and Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. Journal of Philosophy 83 (6):305-322.
DM Hausman (1997). Discussion. The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons - a Reply. Mind 106 (421):99-100.
Daniel M. Hausman (1997). The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons--A Reply. Mind 106 (421):99-100.
Daniel M. Hausman (1995). The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. Mind 104 (415):473-490.
Peter Gärdenfors (1978). Fairness Without Interpersonal Comparisons. Theoria 44 (2):57-74.
Alfred F. Mackay (1975). Interpersonal Comparisons. Journal of Philosophy 72 (17):535-549.
Jon Elster & John E. Roemer (eds.) (1991). Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being. Cambridge University Press.
JP Sevilla, Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being, the Evaluative Attitudes, and Type Correspondence Between Mind and Brain.
Eckehard F. Rosenbaum (1995). Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Positive, Normative or Value-Laden? Journal of Economic Methodology 2 (2):239-258.
Christian List (2003). Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate? Erkenntnis 58 (2):229 - 260.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads10 ( #351,263 of 1,934,424 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #269,405 of 1,934,424 )
How can I increase my downloads?