El descontento de la filosofía tradicional de la ciencia con el concepto de representación. Réplica a Sergio Martínez (The Dissatisfaction of Traditional Philosophy of Science with the Concept of Representation. Reply to Sergio Martinez)

Critica 33 (99):97 - 109 (2001)
Abstract
En esta réplica a la crítica que Sergio Martínez hace de nuestro artículo "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" (UTC) sostenemos que su posición está basada en una aceptación acrítica de algunas dicotomías tradicionales y en una interpretación algo distorsionada de la historia de la filosofía. Indicamos que el enfoque expuesto en UTC no puede calificarse de formalista. En filosofía de la ciencia la distinción entre el enfoque "formalista" y el "historicista" es ya obsoleta. Por ello, tanto las herramientas formales como las informales son de utilidad en la elucidación del concepto de representación, concepto clave de UTC. Además, sostenemos que los argumentos que Martínez recaba de la historia de la filosofía contra nuestro enfoque no son atinados. \\\ In this reply to Martínez's discussion of our paper "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" (UTC) we argue that his criticism is informed by the uncritical acceptance of some traditional dichotomies and a rather distorted interpretation of the history of philosophy. We point out that UTC should not be characterized as a formalist approach. The distinction between "formalist" and "historicist" accounts in philosophy of science is obsolete. Henee, formal and informal means are useful for the explication of the concept of representation to be considered as a key concept of UTC. Moreover, we argue that the arguments from history of philosophy Martínez launches against our account are ill-founded.
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