Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals

Many of the motivations in favor of contextualism about knowledge apply also to a contextualist approach to counterfactuals. I motivate and articulate such an approach, in terms of the context-sensitive 'all cases', in the spirit of David Lewis's contextualist view about knowledge. The resulting view explains intuitive data, resolves a puzzle parallel to the skeptical paradox, and renders safety and sensitivity, construed as counterfactuals, necessary conditions on knowledge
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DOI 10.2307/23035318
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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Citations of this work BETA
Hannes Leitgeb (2014). A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):605-636.

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