Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 145 (3):435 - 443 (2009)
I criticize Timothy Williamson's characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know
Keywords Thought experiments  Intuition  Timothy Williamson
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DOI 10.2307/27734493
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Jonathan Ichikawa (2011). Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287 - 313.

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