Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism
Philosophical Studies 155 (3):383-398 (2011)
| Abstract | I defend a neo-Lewisean form of contextualism about knowledge attributions. Understanding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions in terms of the context-sensitivity of universal quantifiers provides an appealing approach to knowledge. Among the virtues of this approach are solutions to the skeptical paradox and the Gettier problem. I respond to influential objections to Lewis’s account | |||||||||
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Marcus Willaschek (2007). Contextualism About Knowledge and Justification by Default. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):251-272.
Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Antonia Barke (2004). Epistemic Contextualism. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):353 - 373.
Matthew Chrisman (2007). From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):225 - 254.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2012). Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):89-100.
Nikola Kompa (2005). The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions. Acta Analytica 20 (1):16-28.
Jonathan Ichikawa (2011). Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):287-313.
Martin Montminy (2007). Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 155 (1):99 - 125.
Frank Hofmann (2004). Why Epistemic Contextualism Does Not Provide an Adequate Account of Knowledge: Comments on Barke. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):375 - 382.
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