Graduate studies at Western
History and Philosophy of Logic 13 (2):133-148 (1992)
|Abstract||Chrysippus claims that some propositions perish. including some true conditionals whose consequent is impossible and antecedent is possible, to which he appeals against Diodorus?s Master Argument. On the standard interpretation. perished propositions lack truth values. and these conditionals are true at the same time as their antecedents arc possible and consequents impossible. But perished propositions are false, and Chrysippus?s conditionals are true when their antecedent and consequent arc possible, and false when their antecedent is possible and consequent impossible. The claim of the Master Argument that Chrysippus rejects, then, is stronger ihan usually supposed|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
William Lycan (2006). Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals. In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press.
R. McKirahan (1979). Diodorus and Prior and the Master Argument. Synthese 42 (2):223 - 253.
Michael J. White (1980). Diodorus' “Master” Argument: A Semantic Interpretation. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 15 (1):65 - 72.
Scott Labarge (2002). Stoic Conditionals, Necessity and Explanation. History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (4):241-252.
Michael Rescorla (2009). Chrysippus' Dog as a Case Study in Non-Linguistic Cognition. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Papazian (2012). Chrysippus Confronts the Liar: The Case for Stoic Cassationism. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):197-214.
Jay Newhard (2009). The Chrysippus Intuition and Contextual Theories of Truth. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345 - 352.
Michael B. Papazian (2001). Chrysippus and the Destruction of Propositions: A Defence of the Standard Interpretation. History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (1):1-12.
Added to index2009-08-28
Total downloads19 ( #71,310 of 739,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,680 of 739,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?