In Defence of Virtue Epistemology
Synthese 179:409-33 (2011)
| Abstract | In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard's objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Epistemology Virtue Epistemology | |||||||||
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