In Defence of Virtue Epistemology

Synthese 179 (3):409-33 (2011)
In a number of recent papers Duncan Pritchard argues that virtue epistemology's central ability condition—one knows that p if and only if one has attained cognitive success (true belief) because of the exercise of intellectual ability—is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. This paper discusses and dismisses a number of responses to Pritchard's objections and develops a new way of defending virtue epistemology against them.
Keywords Epistemology  Virtue Epistemology
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Jessica Brown (2008). Knowledge and Practical Reason. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.

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