In defence of natural daylight
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):1-18 (2010)
| Abstract | Objects appear different as the illumination under which they are perceived varies. This fact is sometimes thought to pose a problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties: if a coloured object appears different under different illuminations, then under which illumination does the object appear the colour it really is? I argue that given the nature of natural daylight, and certain plausible assumptions about the nature of the colours it illuminates, there is a non-arbitrary reason to suppose that it is under natural daylight that we are able to perceive the real colours of objects. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Keith Allen (2010). Locating The Unique Hues. Rivista di Estetica 43:13-28.
Ralph Schumacher (2007). Guest Editor's Introduction. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2).
Dave Ward (2012). Why Don't Synaesthetic Colours Adapt Away? Philosophical Studies 159 (1):123-138.
Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (forthcoming). Philosophical Issues About Colour Vision. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
Ralph Schumacher (2007). Do We Have to Be Realists About Colour in Order to Be Able to Attribute Colour Perceptions to Other Persons? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):233 - 246.
Carlo Volf (forthcoming). Light and the Aesthetics of Perception. Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 22.
Keith Allen (2009). Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-11-07Total downloads41 ( #27,954 of 549,754 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |

