Mind: The argument from evolutionary biology

Abstract

In this paper I will propose just the simplest part of a three-part hypothesis for a solution of the problem of consciousness.{1} It proposes that the evolutionary rationale for the brains of complex organisms was neither representation nor reactive parallelism as is generally presupposed, but was specifically an internal operational organization of blind biologic process instead. I propose that our cognitive objects are deep operational metaphors of primitive biological response rather than informational referents to environment. I argue that this operational organization was an evolutionary necessity to enable an adroit functioning of profoundly complex metacellular organisms in a hostile and overwhelmingly complex environment. I argue that this organization was antithetical to a representative role however. I have argued elsewhere (Iglowitz, 1995), that this hypothesis, (in concert with ancillary logical and epistemological hypotheses), opens the very first real possibility for an actual and adequate solution of the problem of "consciousness".

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2009-01-28

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