Postphenomenological Re-embodiment

Foundations of Science 17 (4):373-377 (2012)
Abstract
The phenomenological tradition has had a long interest in embodiment, and bodily experience beyond the confines of the “skinbag” body. Here I respond to Helena De Preester’s analysis of different types of protheses: limb, perceptual, cognitive. In her paper “Technology and the body: the (im)possibilities of re-embodiment”, she wants to make finer distinctions between extensions and incorporations . Today’s hi-tech developments make this refinement necessary and possible. I respond to the three levels or types of prostheses taking note of the increasing difficulty at each level and express certain worries about cognitively framed notions of bodily experience.
Keywords Protheses  Embodiment  Re-embodiment  Extension  Incorporation
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