Mind and Brain (An Answer to D. I. Dubrovskii)

Russian Studies in Philosophy 8 (1):87-106 (1969)
The article by D. I. Dubrovskii, "Brain and Mind" [Mozg i psikhika], published in Voprosy filosofii, No. 8, produced in me not only the desire to debate but also the desire to refrain, in that debate, from employing the tone he used. For that reason it seems necessary to me to list the points on which neither I nor, as I understand it, F. T. Mikhailov desires to take issue with the author of "Brain and Mind," because on these matters we are entirely in agreement with him. To proceed in this fashion is necessary not for the sake of academic courtesy, but precisely in order to denote more clearly the actual points of difference between our positions, and then to let the reader decide which path he prefers
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D. I. Dubrovskii (1969). Brain and Mind. Russian Studies in Philosophy 8 (1):67-86.
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