Rational Reconstruction

Theoria 11 (3):33-47 (1996)
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the preconditions and the limits of rational reconstruction in the philosophy of language, as these preconditions and limits can be deduced from Wittgenstein’s arguments against philosophical constructivism. It will be shown that a main precondition of reconstructions in the field of language is the existence of non-arbitrary patterns of linguistic use, while the limits of this kind of theoretical enterprise derive precisely from the absence of such patterns
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