How basic is the basic revisionary argument?

Analysis 68 (4):303-309 (2008)
Abstract
Anti-realists typically contend that truth is epistemically constrained. Truth, they say, cannot outstrip our capacity to know. Some anti-realists are also willing to make a further claim: if truth is epistemically constrained, classical logic is to be given up in favour of intuitionistic logic. Here we shall be concerned with one argument in support of this thesis - Crispin Wright's Basic Revisionary Argument, first presented in his Truth and Objectivity. We argue that the reasoning involved in the argument, if correct, validates a parallel argument that leads to conclusions that are unacceptable to classicists and intuitionists alike.
Keywords Logical revision  Basic Revisionary Argument  Intuitionistic logic
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References found in this work BETA
David Nelson (1949). Constructible Falsity. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):16-26.
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