David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 69 (2):261 - 274 (2008)
Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC.
|Keywords||Mathematical truth Isaacson's Thesis Mathematical naturalism|
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1960). The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Paterson, N.J.,Littlefield, Adams.
Penelope Maddy (1997). Naturalism in Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
Peter Smith (2013). An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems. Cambridge University Press.
Kurt Gödel (1986). Collected Works. Oxford University Press.
Vann McGee (1997). How We Learn Mathematical Language. Philosophical Review 106 (1):35-68.
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