Why so Serious? Non-serious Presentism and the Problem of Cross-temporal Relations

Metaphysica 13 (1):55-63 (2012)
It is a common assumption in the metaphysics of time that a commitment to presentism entails a commitment to serious presentism, the view that objects can exemplify properties or stand in relations only at times at which they exist. As a result, non-serious presentism is widely thought to be beyond the bounds for the card-carrying presentist in response to the problem of cross-temporal relations. In this paper, I challenge this general consensus by examining one common argument in favor of the thesis that presentism entails serious presentism. The argument, I claim, begs the question against non-serious defenders in failing to account for their wider metaontological views concerning non-committal quantification.
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DOI 10.1007/s12133-012-0093-y
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Markosian (2004). A Defence of Presentism. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1 (3):47-82.
Cian Dorr (2008). There Are No Abstract Objects. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell
Thomas M. Crisp (2005). Presentism and "Cross-Time" Relations. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (1):5 - 17.
Matti Eklund (2006). Metaontology. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):317-334.

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