Can a Right of Self-Ownership be Robust?

Law and Philosophy 26 (6):575 - 587 (2007)
According to a renowned left-libertarian, Michael Otsuka, a libertarian right of self-ownership can be so robust that one need not sacrifice the use of one's mind and body to help others. In this article, I demonstrate that Otsuka's way of reconciling this robust conception of self-ownership with equality is not appealing and, at best, would provide limited guidance in the face of real-life uncertainty
Keywords Law   Logic   Political Science   Social Sciences, general   Philosophy of Law   Law Theory/Law Philosophy
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Daniel Attas (2003). The Negative Principle of Just Appropriation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):343 - 372.

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