Science and values: Are value judgments always irrelevant to the justification of scientific claims?
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S506- (2001)
Several feminist theorists have claimed that feminist values ought to influence theory choice. Susan Haack has argued that this is implausible because normative claims about what ought to be the case can never provide justification for descriptive claims. I argue against one of the premises of Haack's argument. Furthermore, I attempt to show that the most promising defense of this premise would cast doubt on a second premise of Haack's argument. My aim is to open up the possibility that value judgments can play a legitimate role in theory choice
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Hugh Lacey (2003). The Behavioral Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments. Behavior and Philosophy 31:209 - 223.
Abdullah Kaygi (2006). Value-Judgements and Values. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:97-102.
Rudolf Haller (1988). Justification and Praxeological Foundationalism. Inquiry 31 (3):335 – 345.
Kristen Intemann (2010). Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now? Hypatia 25 (4):778-796.
Elizabeth Anderson (2004). Uses of Value Judgments in Science: A General Argument, with Lessons From a Case Study of Feminist Research on Divorce. Hypatia 19 (1):1-24.
Sharyn Clough (2008). Solomon's Empirical/Non-Empirical Distinction and the Proper Place of Values in Science. Perspectives on Science 16 (3):pp. 265-279.
H. Vahid (1994). Experience and Belief: Haack on the Problem of Empirical Basis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8 (2):139 – 140.
William A. Rottschaefer (2003). Assessing the Role of Non-Epistemic Feminist Values in Scientific Inquiry. Behavior and Philosophy 31:225 - 249.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads242 ( #11,434 of 1,934,535 )
Recent downloads (6 months)29 ( #21,181 of 1,934,535 )
How can I increase my downloads?