Hume on relations: Are they real?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):185-209 (2010)
Abstract
William James criticizes Hume for failing to adhere to the strictly empiricist method when he postulates discrete constituents of experience—which Hume calls perceptions—thereby making our experience a train of disconnected pieces. James argues that the discontinuity of experience in Hume results in part from his failure to recognize the immediate presence of relations in experience.1 Emphasizing a continuity and unity of experience, James thus differentiates his empiricism from Hume's as being radical in the sense that it recognizes relations as 'real' parts of experience just as are things that are experienced to be so related.2 This raises a question concerning the experiential status of relations in Hume: is ..
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