Two Concepts of Possible Worlds

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):185-213 (1986)
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DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1986.tb00494.x
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Kris McDaniel (2009). Structure-Making. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):251-274.

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