David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In this essay I present what is, I contend, the free-will problem properly thought through, or at least presented in a form in which it is possible to think about it without being constantly led astray by bad terminology and confused ideas. Bad terminology and confused ideas are not uncommon in current discussions of the problem. The worst such pieces of terminology are "libertarian free will" and "compatibilist free will." The essay consists partly of a defense of the thesis that the use of these phrases by writers on the problem of free will can only generate conceptual confusion and partly of a formulation of the problem that does not make use of them. I contend that this formulation is neutral with respect to the historically important positions on free will (e. g., compatibilism and incompatibilism).
|Keywords||Compatibilism Compatibilist free will Determinism Free will Incompatibilism Libertarian free will Libertarianism|
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Added to index2009-01-28
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University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
This is, for the most part, a lovely paper – very clear, very helpful. At the moment I have just one quibble. It has to do with the following sentence:
“(Most of my fellow libertarians think that that the error in the Mind argument - they agree with my conviction that that’s where the error is to be found – can be exposed by reflection of the concept of “agent causation. “ “ [p.23]
It's a monster - right?