David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Ethics 3 (4):341 - 350 (1999)
In his classic paper, "The Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Harry Frankfurt presented counterexamples to the principle named in his title: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. He went on to argue that the falsity of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) implied that the debate between the "compatibilists" and the "incompatibilists" (as regards determinism and the ability to do otherwise) did not have the significance that both parties had attributed to it - since moral responsibility could exist even if no one was able to do otherwise. I have argued that even if PAP is false, there are other principles that imply that moral responsibility entails the ability to do otherwise, and that these principles are immune to "Frankfurt-style" counterexamples. Frankfurt has attempted to show that my arguments for this conclusion fail. This paper is a rejoinder to that reply; I argue that he has failed to show this.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Peter van Inwagen (1999). Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Ethics 3 (4):343-351.
Richard M. Glatz (2008). The (Near) Necessity of Alternate Possibilities for Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257 - 272.
Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). Neo-Frankfurtians and Buffer Cases: The New Challenge to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.
David P. Hunt (2000). Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227.
Phillip D. Gosselin (1979). Is There a Freedom Requirement for Moral Responsibility? Dialogue 18 (03):289-306.
Daniel James Speak (2007). The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):76-95.
Kevin Timpe (2009). Causal History Matters, but Not for Individuation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):77-91.
Maria Alvarez (2009). Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Gordon Pettit (2005). Moral Responsibility and the Ability to Do Otherwise. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:303-319.
Phillip Gosselin (1982). Moral Responsibility and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Philosophy Research Archives 8:499-512.
Ishtiyaque Haji (2010). Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.
Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.
Peter van Inwagen (1978). Ability and Responsibility. Philosophical Review 87 (April):201-24.
Galen Strawson (1986). On the Inevitability of Freedom (From the Compatibilist Point of View). American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):393-400.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads23 ( #74,633 of 1,100,944 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #176,807 of 1,100,944 )
How can I increase my downloads?