Manipulabilidad Y entidades inobservables (manipulability and unobservable entities)

Theoria 15 (1):131-153 (2000)
Abstract Una estrategia recientemente utilizada por los defensores deI realismo científico ha sido derivar implicaciones ontológicas deI contexto manipulativo-experimental. EI artículo pretende comparar y valorar dos enfoques diferentes deI argumento de la manipulabilidad -I. Hacking y R. Harré-, cuya idea basíca es que, de cara a establecer la existencia de una entidad, manipularla puede ser tan importante corno observarla. Por último, a fin de evitar los aspectos más cuestionables de ambos enfoques, propongo entender la eficacia manipulativa corno obtención de informacion fiable. The ‘manipulability argument’ has been reeently employed in favour of scientific realism. The underlying idea is that, in order to establish the existence of an entity, manipulating it is so important as observing it. Two different approaches to the ’manipulability argument’ are compared: Ian Hacking’s ‘experimental realism’ and Rom Harré’s ‘depth realism’. In order to avoid the most controversial aspects of both approaches, I suggest that manipulative efficacy be understood as the attainment of reliable information
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