The Problem of Free Will: a Contemporary Introduction

Acumen (2012)
Abstract
The book explores what it is about the free will problem that makes it so intractable and argues that the only acceptable solution must be one consistent with what science tells us about the world. It is here, maintains Iredale, that many works on free will, introductory or otherwise, fall down, by focusing only on how free will relates to determinism. He shows that there are clear areas of scientific research which are directly and significantly relevant to free will in a way that does not involve determinism. Although these areas of scientific research may not allow us to solve the problem, they do enable us to separate the more plausible ideas concerning free will from the less plausible.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,738
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Eric T. Olson (2003). Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

Added to index

2012-11-26

Total downloads

0

Recent downloads (6 months)

0

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.