Faith and Philosophy 20 (4):430-447 (2003)
|Abstract||Augustine defends three claims about the passions: (1) The Stoic position differs only verbally from the Platonic-Aristotelian position. (2) The Stoic positionis wrong and the Platonic-Aristotelian position is right. (3) The will is engaged in the different passions; indeed the different passions are different expressionsof the will. The first two claims, properly understood, are defensible. But the most plausible versions of them give us good reason to doubt the third claim|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Douglas Hedley (2011). “The Monstrous Centaur”? Joseph de Maistre on Reason, Passion and Violence. Faith and Philosophy 28 (1):71-81.
Brad Inwood & Lloyd P. Gerson (eds.) (2008). The Stoics Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia. Hackett Pub. Co., Inc..
Ron Williston (2003). The Epistemic Problem of Cartesian Passions. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):309-332.
Thomas Cook, Adequate Understanding of Inadequate Ideas: Power and Paradox in Spinoza's Cognitive Therapy.
Amy M. Schmitter (2002). Descartes and the Primacy of Practice: The Role of the Passions in the Search for Truth. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):99 - 108.
Stephen Gaukroger (ed.) (1998). The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century. Routledge.
Alexander Broadie (2010). Aristotle, Adam Smith and the Virtue of Propriety. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (1):79-89.
Andrew Fiala (2003). Stoic Tolerance. Res Publica 9 (2).
T. H. Irwin (2003). Augustine's Criticisms of the Stoic Theory of Passions. Faith and Philosophy 20 (4):430-447.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads2 ( #234,650 of 556,803 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,803 )
How can I increase my downloads?