Augustine's criticisms of the stoic theory of passions

Faith and Philosophy 20 (4):430-447 (2003)
Abstract
Augustine defends three claims about the passions: (1) The Stoic position differs only verbally from the Platonic-Aristotelian position. (2) The Stoic positionis wrong and the Platonic-Aristotelian position is right. (3) The will is engaged in the different passions; indeed the different passions are different expressionsof the will. The first two claims, properly understood, are defensible. But the most plausible versions of them give us good reason to doubt the third claim
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,007
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Andrew Fiala (2003). Stoic Tolerance. Res Publica 9 (2):149-168.
Ron Williston (2003). The Epistemic Problem of Cartesian Passions. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):309-332.
William O. Stephens, Stoic Ethics. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-01-09

Total downloads

14 ( #113,932 of 1,101,182 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #44,374 of 1,101,182 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.