David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 54 (5):442 - 459 (2011)
Abstract Six apparent features of Kant's conception of autonomy appear to differentiate it sharply from anything that we can find in an Aristotelian conception of will and practical reason. (1) Autonomy requires a role for practical reason independent of its instrumental role in relation to non-rational desires. (2) This role belongs to the rational will. (3) This role consists in the rational will's being guided by its own law. (4) This guidance by the law of the will itself requires acts of legislation?the making of laws?for oneself. (5) These acts of legislation constitute the law as one's own law, as moral constructivists hold. (6) Kant marks this character of the rational will by using ?autonomy? and cognates. These six apparent features, however, do not mark any discontinuity between Kant and an Aristotelian conception. The first three apparent features are genuinely Kantian, but are not aspects of discontinuity, whereas the last three mark aspects of discontinuity, but are not genuinely Kantian
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Karl Ameriks (2000). Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Alison Hills (2008). Kantian Value Realism. Ratio 21 (2):182–200.
Robert Stern (2007). Freedom, Self-Legislation and Morality in Kant and Hegel: Constructivist Vs. Realist Accounts. In Espen Hammer (ed.), German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge 245--66.
T. H. Irwin (1992). Who Discovered the Will? Philosophical Perspectives 6:453-473.
J. B. Schneewind (1992). 10 Autonomy, Obligation, and Virtue: An Overview of Kant's Moral Philosophy. In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant. Cambridge University Press 3--309.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Onora O'Neill (2003). The Inaugural Address: Autonomy: The Emperor's New Clothes. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77:1 - 21.
Robert S. Taylor (2005). Kantian Personal Autonomy. Political Theory 33 (5):602-628.
Sheila McLean (2010). Autonomy, Consent and the Law. Routledge-Cavendish.
Lara Denis (2005). Autonomy and the Highest Good. Kantian Review 10 (1):33-59.
Andrews Reath (2006). Agency and Autonomy in Kant's Moral Theory. Oxford University Press.
Frederick Neuhouser (2011). Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Origins of Autonomy. Inquiry 54 (5):478 - 493.
Rüdiger Bittner (2002). Autonomy, and Then. Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):217 – 228.
Christine M. Korsgaard, A Reply to Carol Voeller and Rachel Cohon: “The Moral Law as the Source of Normativity” by Carol Voeller "The Roots of Reason" by Rachel Cohon.
Barbara Secker (1999). The Appearance of Kant's Deontology in Contemporary Kantianism: Concepts of Patient Autonomy in Bioethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 24 (1):43 – 66.
Christian F. Rostbøll (2011). Kantian Autonomy and Political Liberalism. Social Theory and Practice 37 (3):341-364.
Piotr T. Makowski (2006). Autonomia w etyce I. Kanta (próba interpretacji historystycznej). Diametros 10:34-64.
Christopher W. Gowans (2002). Practical Identities and Autonomy: Korsgaard's Reformation of Kant's Moral Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):546-570.
James Bell (2007). Absolve You to Yourself: Emerson's Conception of Rational Agency. Inquiry 50 (3):234 – 252.
Added to index2011-09-09
Total downloads34 ( #95,542 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?