Online research in philosophy

Thomas Kuhn was undoubtedly the strongest influence on the philosophy of science in the last third of the twentieth century. Yet today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century it is unclear what his legacy really is. In the philosophy of science there is no characteristically Kuhnian school. This could be because we are all Kuhnians now. But it might also be because Kuhn’s thought, although revolutionary in its time, has since been superseded. In a sense both may be true. We are all Copernicans—yet almost everything Copernicus believed we now disbelieve. In this paper I shall examine the development of Kuhn’s thought in connection with changes in the philosophy of science during the second half of the twentieth century. Now that philosophy in general, philosophy of science in particular, is in a post-positivist era, we all share Kuhn’s rejection of positivism. But we do not, for the most part, share Kuhn’s belief in incommensurability, or his scepticism about truth and objective knowledge. Just as in Copernicus’ case, Kuhn initiated a revolution that went far beyond what he himself envisaged or even properly understood.

Relatively recent work on Carnap, based on his published papers and books as well as on his unpublished correspondence and other material, has suggested that Carnap and Kuhn might not have been miles apart when it comes to the issue of theory-change (cf. Earman 1993; Irzik & Grunberg 1995). Two prevailing thoughts are that a) Kuhnian ‘paradigms’ might be taken to be very similar to Carnapian ‘linguistic frameworks’ (cf. Irzik & Grunberg 1995, 286) and b) Kuhnian ‘incommensurability’ between competing paradigms is consonant with Carnap’s thesis that when a linguistic framework is replaced by another, there is a change of language and the analytic-synthetic distinction (which is supposed to separate the meaning-fixing from the fact-stating component of a language) needs to be redrawn within the new framework (cf. Irzik & Grunberg 1995, 300-1). Irzik and Grunberg have gone on to note that Carnap endorsed “semantic incommensurability” (op.cit., 286). They base their claim on the theses that a) Carnap endorsed meaning holism; b) Carnap endorsed the thesis of ‘theory-ladenness of observation’. They are certainly right in saying that “without semantic holism semantic incommensurability would be groundless; without theory-ladenness it would be severely restricted to the theoretical terms” (op.cit., 293). But, I think, they are wrong in claiming that Carnap endorsed either meaning holism or the theory-ladenness of observation. The aim of this paper is to show how Carnap avoided the alleged problem of incommensurability. Better put, Carnap’s view about the language of science (the linguistic framework in which theories are cast) is such that this problem does not arise. Drawing on his published and unpublished material, I highlight some connections between his work on semantics (and in particular his method of intension and extension in his Meaning and Necessity) and his mature work on the structure of scientific theories, which was based on his re-invention of the Ramsey-sentences..

The objective of this article is to sketch an historical analysis of the change in the philosophy of science that took place in the 1950s and 1960s around the time of the publication of Structure by Thomas Kuhn. I offer an alternative to the revisionist interpretation that this change is marked by ignorance or neglect, on the part of Kuhn and others, of logical positivism in its more mature form, in this way serving the revolutionary strategy. Countering this conception, I present good reasons for the philosophy of science community, in that historical context, to have used the logical positivist project as their reference and target of criticism rather than the later work of Carnap. I suggest that, faced with the original version of the project, the critics saw Carnap’s “liberalizations” as degenerative. I hold that the revisionists, in turn, neglected the historical context surrounding the philosophical change in question, and touched up the image of positivism from a contemporary perspective.

Abstract: In this paper I use or refer to a lot of metaphors, like "Brutus" for Kuhn, "Trojan Horse" for the Structure, "adopted sons" for Quine and Popper, "battlefield" for parts of philosophy. These are however only illustrations to possible theses or questions I investigate: "Did Kuhn refute logical positivism?", Why was Carnap so tolerating so much Popper, Quine and Kuhn?", "Why did logical positivism go away?". I will argue that a complex view should be developed abut these questions synthesising both Friedman's, Irzik's, Earman's, and Reisch's view on the one hand and Oliveira's on the other hand, who is criticising them. I try to sketch this complex view, which of course is not an attempt to a full story of logical positivism. Finally I describe Carnap's Principle of Tolerance as not merely a theory, but as a personal, ethical view, which he adopted in his behaviour with Kuhn, Popper, Quine and other rival philosophers.

In this paper, one aspect of Carnap's philosophy is examined, namely the relations of Carnap's various views and the rationality of theory acceptance in science. Irzik, Friedman and others have shown already that the so called “standard account” – presenting Carnap as an “arch rationalist”- is over-simplified. Friedman’s earlier view was criticized by Irzik to be too relativistic. I agree with these critiques; however I attempt to show that even Irzik’s and Friedman’s later view – which converge to each other - are not adequate. Their argument based on linguistical framework is examined, but several defects are shown. I point out that linguistical frameworks can be wider and narrower, which makes the conclusion invalid. Carnap’s view on theory acceptance is investigated and we find that Carnap accepted algorithmic evaluation of degree of confirmation, but rejected a binary theory choice. I argue that the reason for this is avoidance of information loss and not framework relativity. Irzik’s and Friedman’s term of “instrumental rationality” is analyzed, and some conceptual problems are indicated. I reason that Carnap’s conventionalism has to be regarded with keeping in mind his distinction of synthetical and analytical questions. Friedman’s hierarchy of frameworks, - which he constructed as an extension of Carnap’s and Kuhn’s theory - is discussed, and I propose another hierarchy of frameworks and give some arguments why it is more fruitful than Friedman’s.

In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed. One aspect of this revisionism -defended by authors like Michael Friedman, John Earman and George Reisch - is the thesis that Carnap’s later thought is compatible with that of Kuhn and even that Carnap anticipates some relevant points of Kuhn’s theory of science. In this paper I discuss one of Carnap’s texts most frequently cited by revisionists in favor of their thesis -"Truth and Confirmation" - trying to put it in the context of Carnap’s work. My intention is to analyze revisionist interpretation on the basis of other texts by Carnap and show that revisionists, while assembling their jigsaw puzzle concerning Carnap’s work, have inadvertently forgotten to consider some pieces of importance in the formation of a theoretically and historically cogent picture.

Idealist Heresies in Philosophy of Science: Cassirer, Carnap, and Kuhn. As common wisdom has it, philosophy of science in the analytic tradition and idealist philosophy are incompatible. Usually, not much effort is spent for explaining what is to be understood by idealism. Rather, it is taken for granted that idealism is an obsolete and unscientific philosophical account. In this paper it is argued that this thesis needs some qualification. Taking Carnap and Kuhn as paradigmatic examples of positivist and postpositivist philosophies of science it is shown that these accounts share important features with Cassirer's idealist philosophy of science developed in the first half of this century. As it turns out, often Cassirer is more modern than those classical philosophers of (post)posivitist philosophy of science. For instance, Quine's criticism against Carnap's empiricist philosophy of science launched in Two Dogmas of Empiricism is anticipated by Cassirer for several decades.

In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap's work. In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap "would have found Structure philosophically congenial". I claim that Kuhn's book, from Carnap's point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery—justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that, despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn's book in his work in philosophy of science.

In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap's work. In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap "would have found Structure philosophically congenial". I claim that Kuhn's book, from Carnap's point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery—justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that, despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn's book in his work in philosophy of science.

In the light of two unpublished letters from Carnap to Kuhn, this essay examines the relationship between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Carnap's philosophical views. Contrary to the common wisdom that Kuhn's book refuted logical empiricism, it argues that Carnap's views of revolutionary scientific change are rather similar to those detailed by Kuhn. This serves both to explain Carnap's appreciation of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and to suggest that logical empiricism, insofar as that program rested on Carnap's shoulders, was not substantially upstaged by Kuhn's book.