David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Society 5 (2):199-211 (2006)
An argument is advanced to show why E-admissibility should be preferred over maximality as a principle of rational choice where rationality is understood as minimal rationality. Consideration is given to the distinction between second best and second worst options in three way choice that is ignored according to maximality. It is shown why the behavior exhibited in addressing the problems posed by Allais (Econometrica 21:503–546, 1952) and by Ellsberg (Q Econ 75:643–669, 1961) do not violate the independence postulate according to minimal rationality
|Keywords||V-admissibility Maximality E-admissibility Value structure Extended value structure Categorical preference Revealed preference Independence or sure thing principle|
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References found in this work BETA
Isaac Levi (1986). Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict. Cambridge University Press.
Isaac Levi (1974). On Indeterminate Probabilities. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
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