Mind and Society 5 (2):199-211 (2006)
|Abstract||An argument is advanced to show why E-admissibility should be preferred over maximality as a principle of rational choice where rationality is understood as minimal rationality. Consideration is given to the distinction between second best and second worst options in three way choice that is ignored according to maximality. It is shown why the behavior exhibited in addressing the problems posed by Allais (Econometrica 21:503â546, 1952) and by Ellsberg (Q Econ 75:643â669, 1961) do not violate the independence postulate according to minimal rationality|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Viktor J. Vanberg (2004). The Rationality Postulate in Economics: Its Ambiguity, its Deficiency and its Evolutionary Alternative. Journal of Economic Methodology 11 (1):1-29.
Danny Frederick (2013). Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science. THEORIA 28 (1):61-75.
Andre Kukla (1991). Criteria of Rationality and the Problem of Logical Sloth. Philosophy of Science 58 (3):486-490.
Thomas Kelly (2007). Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465–474.
Thomas Spitzley (2009). Self-Knowledge and Rationality. Erkenntnis 71 (1):73 - 88.
Isaac Levi (1997). The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought. Cambridge University Press.
Maurice Lagueux (2004). The Forgotten Role of the Rationality Principle in Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 11 (1):31-51.
Jeffrey Foss (1976). A Rule of Minimal Rationality: The Logical Link Between Beliefs and Values. Inquiry 19 (1-4):341 – 353.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads8 ( #123,255 of 549,671 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,671 )
How can I increase my downloads?