The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg

Economics and Philosophy 2 (01):23- (1986)
In The Enterprise of Knowledge (Levi, 1980a), I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach to human knowledge and valuation favored by the American pragmatists, Charles Peirce and John Dewey. A feature of any acceptable view of inquiry ought to be that during an inquiry points under dispute ought to be kept in suspense pending resolution through inquiry.
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References found in this work BETA
Isaac Levi (1982). Conflict and Social Agency. Journal of Philosophy 79 (5):231-247.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jochen Runde (1994). Keynes After Ramsey: In Defence of a Treatise on Probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (1):97-121.

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