The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg

Economics and Philosophy 2 (1):23 (1986)
In The Enterprise of Knowledge, I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach to human knowledge and valuation favored by the American pragmatists, Charles Peirce and John Dewey. A feature of any acceptable view of inquiry ought to be that during an inquiry points under dispute ought to be kept in suspense pending resolution through inquiry
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DOI 10.1017/S026626710000078X
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References found in this work BETA
Isaac Levi (1974). On Indeterminate Probabilities. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.

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John Collins (2015). Neophobia. Res Philosophica 92 (2):283-300.
John Collins (2015). Risk and Rationality, by Buchak, Lara. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):825-828.

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