David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Asian Philosophy 21 (2):193 - 211 (2011)
In this paper, I argue that later Nishida's analysis of self-awareness (jikaku) provides a new perspective on the nature of self-awareness as understood in the philosophical literature today. I argue that the contemporary literature deals with two kinds of self-awareness; the higher-order theory understands self-awareness to be an objectified awareness and the phenomenological tradition generally understands self-awareness to be, at least primarily, a non-objectified awareness. In light of this, I first give an account of Nishida's ?acting-intuition? with reference to the ?historical body.? Then I argue that later Nishida's analysis of self-awareness depicts the inadequacy of the two kinds of self-awareness as both being stuck in the subject-object dichotomy which, according to Nishida, is but one mode of experience, namely the mode of difference. Nishida provides an account that ultimately foregrounds the experiential mode of unity that negates any sense of differentiation between the subject and object
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Dan Zahavi (2002). First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation Between Recent Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.
Rocco J. Gennaro (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330.
Andrew Feenberg (1999). Experience and Culture: Nishida's Path "to the Things Themselves". Philosophy East and West 49 (1):28-44.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 157--180.
Joel Krueger (2008). Nishida, Agency, and the 'Self-Contradictory' Body. Asian Philosophy 18 (3):213 – 229.
Michael Kelly (2002). Self-Awareness and Ontological Monism. Idealistic Studies 32 (3):237-254.
Michael Huemer (1998). A Direct Realist Account of Perceptual Awareness. Dissertation, Rutgers University
Nishida Kitarō & John W. M. Krummel (2012). The Unsolved Issue of Consciousness. Philosophy East and West 62 (1):44-51.
Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325.
John Schwenkler (2013). The Objects of Bodily Awareness. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.
Dan Zahavi (2000). Self and Consciousness. In Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins 55--74.
Christopher Peacocke (2006). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Jonathan D. Cohen & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell
Mario Vaneechoutte (2000). Experience, Awareness, and Consciousness: Suggestions for Definitions as Offered by an Evolutionary Approach. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 5 (4):429-456.
Curtis A. Rigsby (2009). Nishida on God, Barth and Christianity. Asian Philosophy 19 (2):119 – 157.
Mark Rowlands (2008). From the Inside: Consciousness and the First-Person Perspective. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):281 – 297.
Matthew Kennedy (2007). Visual Awareness of Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298-325.
Hisayasu Kobayashi (2010). Self-Awareness and Mental Perception. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):233-245.
Added to index2011-05-11
Total downloads43 ( #84,323 of 1,780,204 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #166,601 of 1,780,204 )
How can I increase my downloads?