A finite analog to the löwenheim-Skolem theorem

Studia Logica 53 (4):503 - 532 (1994)
The traditional model theory of first-order logic assumes that the interpretation of a formula can be given without reference to its deductive context. This paper investigates an interpretation which depends on a formula's location within a derivation. The key step is to drop the assumption that all quantified variables must have the same range and to require only that the ranges of variables in a derivation must be related in such way as to preserve the soundness of the inference rules. With each (consistent) derivation there is associated a Buridan-Volpin (orBV) structure [M, {r(x)}] which is simply a Tarski structureM for the language and a map giving the ranger(x) of each variablex in the derivation. IfLK* is (approximately) the classical sequent calculusLK of Gentzen from which the structural contraction rules have been dropped, then our main result reads: If a set of first-ordered formulas has a Tarski modelM, then from any normal derivationD inLK* of can be constructed aBV modelM D=[M, {r(x)}] of where each ranger(x) is finite.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01057648
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Gaisi Takeuti (1987). Proof Theory. Sole Distributors for the U.S.A. And Canada, Elsevier Science Pub. Co..

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