Synthese 136 (3):305 - 320 (2003)
|Abstract||The most potentially powerful objection to the possibility oftime travel stems from the fact that it can, under the right conditions, give rise to closedcausal loops, and closed causal loops can be turned into self-defeating causal chains;folks killing their infant selves, setting out to destroy the world before they were born,and the like. It used to be thought that such chains present paradoxes; the receivedwisdom nowadays is that they give rise to physical anomalies in the form of inexplicably correlated events. I argue against the received wisdom. I can find nothing in them that argues against the possibility (even, the probability) of time travel.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael D. Robinson (2004). Divine Providence, Simple Foreknowledge, and the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. Religious Studies 40 (4):471-483.
Susan Weir (1988). Closed Time and Causal Loops: A Defence Against Mellor. Analysis 48 (4):203 - 209.
Bradley Monton (2003). Presentists Can Believe in Closed Timelike Curves. Analysis 63 (3):199–202.
S. E. Ney (2000). Are Grandfathers an Endangered Species? Journal of Philosophical Research 25:311-321.
Bradley Monton (2007). Time Travel Without Causal Loops. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):54-67.
Phil Dowe (2001). Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts. Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S89-.
Richard Hanley (2004). No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics and Fiction. Synthese 141 (1):123 - 152.
J. Berkovitz (2001). On Chance in Causal Loops. Mind 110 (437):1-23.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads32 ( #37,849 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #10,270 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?