Science and the phenomenal

Philosophy of Science 66 (3):351-69 (1999)
Abstract
The Hard Problem of the mind is addressed and it is argued that physical-phenomenal property identities have the same status as the identification of an ostended bit of physical space and the coordinates assigned the spot on a map of the terrain. It is argued, that is to say, that such identities are, or follow from, stipulations which interpret the map
Keywords Experience  Perception  Phenomena  Science  Chalmers, D
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DOI 10.1086/392692
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