British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):79-91 (1996)
|Abstract||The chance of a physical event is the objective, single-case probability that it will occur. In probabilistic physical theories like quantum mechanics, the chances of physical events play the formal role that the values of physical quantities play in classical (deterministic) physics, and there is a temptation to regard them on the model of the latter as describing intrinsic properties of the systems to which they are assigned. I argue that this understanding of chances in quantum mechanics, despite being a part of the orthodox interpretation of the theory and the most prevalent view in the physical community, is incompatible with a very wide range of metaphysical views about the nature of chance. The options that remain are unlikely to be attractive to scientists and scientifically minded philosophers.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Federico Laudisa, Relational Quantum Mechanics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
J. T. Ismael (2009). Probability in Deterministic Physics. Journal of Philosophy 106 (2):89-108.
Jenann Ismael (2011). A Modest Proposal About Chance. Journal of Philosophy 108 (8).
Jenann Ismael (2009). Probability in Deterministic Physics. Journal of Philosophy 106 (2):89-108.
Amit Hagar & Giuseppe Sergioli, Counting Steps: A New Interpretation of Objective Probability in Physics.
Barry Loewer (2004). David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.
Carl Hoefer (2007). The Third Way on Objective Probability: A Sceptic's Guide to Objective Chance. Mind 116 (463):549 - 596.
Luke Glynn (2010). Deterministic Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):51–80.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #64,378 of 549,090 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #15,152 of 549,090 )
How can I increase my downloads?