Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 155 (3):399-420 (2011)
|Abstract||Against its prominent compatiblist and libertarian opponents, I defend Galen Strawsonâ€™s Basic Argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility. Against John Martin Fischer, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that an agent can be responsible for an action only if he is responsible for every factor contributing to that action. Against Alfred Mele and Randolph Clarke, I argue that it is absurd to believe that an agent can be responsible for an action when no factor contributing to that action is up to that agent. Against Derk Pereboom and Clarke, I argue that the versions of agent-causal libertarianism they claim can immunize the agent to the Basic Argument actually fail to do so. Against Robert Kane, I argue that the Basic Argument does not rely on the premise that simply the presence of indeterministic factors in the process of bringing an action about is itself what rules out the agentâ€™s chance for being responsible for that action|
|Keywords||Moral responsibility Ultimate responsibility Free will Determinism Libertarianism Compatibilism Basic Argument Galen Strawson John Martin Fischer Alfred Mele Derk Pereboom Randolph Clarke Robert Kane|
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