Friedman's Relativised A Priori and Structural Realism: In Search of Compatibility
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (1):23 - 37 (2011)
| Abstract | In this article I discuss a recent argument due to Dan McArthur, who suggests that the charge that Michael Friedman?s relativised a priori leads to irrationality in theory change can be avoided by adopting structural realism. I provide several arguments to show that the conjunction of Friedman?s relativised a priori with structural realism cannot make the former avoid the charge of irrationality. I also explore the extent to which Friedman?s view and structural realism are compatible, a presupposition of McArthur?s argument. This compatibility is usually questioned, due to the Kantian aspect of Friedman?s view, which clashes with the metaphysical premise of scientific realism. I argue that structural realism does not necessarily depend on this premise and as a consequence can be compatible with Friedman?s view, but more importantly I question whether Friedman?s view really implies mind dependence | |||||||||
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